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politicians to interact in an effective manner, advancing and defending their interests.
A widespread ideology lowers the costs of reception of a point of view based on the ideology. A predominant ideology also drastically raises the costs of disseminating alternative points of view. In addition, the costs of coordinating the actions of individuals not in agreement with the predominant ideology also become higher. This is why the dominance of some one single ideology creates a situation reminiscent of lack of freedom of speech and assembly, or one similar to the presence of limits imposed upon these freedoms.
The weakening of political competition, brought about by such dominance, cannot fail to be reflected by the safeguards for private property, and ultimately by the condition of the business climate.
Intuitively, there is an obvious mutual connection between attitudes to the market, property, business, and a whole series of views having nothing at all to do with economics. The conglomerate of such views is what is normally called ideology.
Definitions abound for the concept of "ideology" (lit., "teaching about views").
Overall, they single out as a key element the systemic nature of a set of opinions (worldviews) and notions. Occasionally, this involves tying such systems in with different time periods, lands, or political circumstances. The present text appeals to the following definition: ideology is the system of opinions advanced (disseminated) for political purposes, a model of societal life. Such a model makes it possible to lower the costs of interaction between politicians and citizens (for instance, as an indicator of "belongs/does not belong").
Ideology includes a set of notions about politics, religion, morals, and economics.
The set of notions determines how the reception of various problems proceeds (the set is more or less logical, being coordinated within). Finally, the set is easy to comprehend, to the point that it can be absorbed by the population en masse and used by individuals usually not interested in any great depth in the issues listed thus far.
Thus, most may be only remotely acquainted with certain documents and texts, but read books or articles that are difficult to understand and that deal with social-political or religious-ethical issues. Even so, they are easily capable of self-determination in terms of their positive or negative attitudes and the degree of support they are willing to grant the Bible, the Koran, or the "Communist Party Manifesto" (or Das Kapital) .
Competition in the political arena, and thus the very idea of electability and accountability of the authorities or of the transparence, predictability, and lawfulness of their decisions are hardly compatible with a unique worldview or ideology in society.
We should make an important disclaimer. An ideology usually cannot be reduced to a set of principles such as: "No killing, no stealing, no bearing false witness, no raping, no doing unto another of what is hateful to oneself; in general: live and let live." An ideology may be compatible or incompatible with these rules, it may include them completely or in part, but usually it is not exhausted by them. This is true even though this set of norms, when widely accepted and deeply rooted in society, provides stability of law and order protecting the life, freedom, and property of people. This enables conditions to crystallize which encourage long-term economic growth. Just how wholesome thinking may be bound up with a healthy business climate (conditions favorable to economic growth) will be the subject of our detailed study in Chapter 12.
There, too, we will consider how desirable it may be to have a single and unchanging set of basic moral norms (to a degree, comparable to the issue of desirability from the point of view of the economy of having a stable Constitution and other essential legislation). A multitude of mutually contradictory principles within a single legal system is likely to lead to enormous problems, to the point of causing civil war. The case of competition among the most basic laws is something we will not consider, 3 but will rather devote attention to society models with competing moral systems.
3 A rudimentary understanding of this state of affairs may be achieved by considering the situation of 1992-'93, prior to the ratification of the Constitution on December 12, 1993. The previous Constitution in Article 1 proclaimed the "rule of the people… the republican form of government, and the division of power" to be the "unchanging bases of the constitutional state." At the same time, a single authority, the Congress, had "the authority to consider and resolve any question referred for conducting by the Russian Federation." (Article 104) What does it mean when the rules "A is true" and "A is not true" are both in effect within a single legal construct (as well as within a logical construct) at the same time? A healthy state of competition among political groups in such a situation permits any action whatsoever, including those which exceed all limits. This is why it risks degenerating into an armed conflict -the Ideology's predicament is just the opposite. In order to minimize the threat to the basal moral values which we have listed, competition among ideologies must be free and acute.
Ideology is in a certain sense a set of signals indicative of the strength of the group or the coalition of groups supporting the ideology. Such a set can perform a coordinating function under conditions of indeterminacy. Discussions in which economists are taking part are already under way concerning the role played by coordination mechanisms for taking over and maintaining a hold on power. 4 This is why the predominance of one such mechanism can lead to the predominance of a single political force.
In the most elementary of situations, ideology can be constructed based on the thoroughly primitive foundations of such reactions as hatred and fear.
The phenomenon of hatred and the use made of it for coordinating collective action is analyzed by E. Gleizer in The Political Economy of Hatred. The author supposes that, given two-party democratic competition, the overwhelming majority of the voters are exposed to stimuli too weak to make a politician need a means as powerful as hatred.
He also makes an allowance for that hatred is not bound up with real offenses suffered in the past. Similar constructs are also demonstrated by K. Robin, 5 who tries to come up with grounding for the claim, that fear is an adequate reaction to only one certain type of totalitarian regime. Now, the list of such regimes remains closed. Fear is also "legit" in the face of American conservatism. Contemporary conservatism must occupy the last "slot," the last spot reserved by the author in the -let us stressclosed list. The new "potentially totalitarian" conservative regime legitimated itself in part earlier by the existence of communism, just as it does now by the challenge of Islamic terrorism.
The authors mentioned are certain that the absence of justified grounds for fear and hatred in many cases which they describe is indicative of the irrelevance and social threat of any ideologies which appeal to fear and hatred. This view seems easy to attack, as do the attempts to cast "prejudices" (stereotypes, if a priori emotionally loaded terms are given up) in a purely negative light. Stereotypes are long-lived for ultimate means of establishing who is right in a situation in which all parties are "right" (or else all are "wrong"). 4 Hardin 1997, Chapter 2.
precisely the reason that in most cases they make it possible to make the right choice at minimal cost. Fear can often save one from a real enemy deserving of hatred. And the converse: "openness" of thought leads to considerable difficulties.
Soviet citizens who belonged to categories subject to persecution by the Nazis were right in doubting the truthfulness of Stalinist propaganda in 1941. They often transferred their distrust to the anti-Hitler component of this propaganda. Their doubts were that much better grounded considering that they were buttressed by the personal recollections that many people had of the German occupation of 1918. Besides, they were reinforced by the incredible flexibility of the predilections of the Bolshevist leaders, who would forget about the Nazi threat one moment, and the next moment turn the term "Nazi" ("fascist") into a meaningless tag, a universal accusation of minimal disloyalty to the regime, a dirty word.
It follows that people less subject to stereotyped thinking, fear, and hatred which fear feeds, were more likely to end up in the death camps, the gas chambers, or the execution pits; and vice versa.
In a Rule of Law Democracy, a dynamic ideology (and therefore one willingly defended by its supporters 6 ) teaches the "swamp" as to whom they should join so as to enjoy the benefit of the feeling of being one with the winner, of enjoying the sense of being "like everybody," of being "no worse than the others."
Given a dictatorship, in a pre-legal society -a "Rule of Force" type of societythis indication helps the populace avoid repression by the ruling bandit. In a transit situation, during the struggle for power of a few bandits, ideological signals (what appears in the papers, what is broadcast on radio and television, in mosques and in schools) make it possible to minimize the high risks of that the bandit with the "best chances" and waxing ever stronger will make short shrift of his victims. That is, ideological dictates and uniformity are a signal of the "normalcy" of the situation in such a society.
By contrast, for a Rule of Law democracy, the evident predominance of a single ideology in the mass media or in the system of education is an evident signal of disrepair. We discussed such signals above, in Chapter 2. Ad loc, we also noted the objective coincidence of interests of the workers of the "public" TV and radio corporations, schools, and other institutions which expect to be granted budgetary 6 Noelle-Neumann 1996. monies instead of contributions or payments for services (that is, interest in redistribution of tax monies to cover the supply of a certain set of "mixed public goods").
Obviously, during certain isolated periods -for instance, profound crises or rapid There is a notion abroad to the effect that ideology plays an especially important role in totalitarian states. But it should be remembered that considerable correcting of ideology in such a country is surprisingly easily brought about. There are quite a few examples: the replacement of internationalism with chauvinism in the USSR, or the replacement of equalizing redistribution with market principles in China, to say nothing of the numerous "oscillations of the exchange rate" of "friendly parties"
(including the events of June 22, 1941, which did so much to inspire George Orwell).
By contrast, spreading any one certain ideology under conditions of severe political competition among free market agents requires considerable effort, time, and investments. Below we will consider the impact of ideology on economic climate, as well as its influence on the decision making process in democratic countries.
There are a fair number of channels for influence of this kind: by means of the education system, by means of the voters' and the political leaders' perception, by means of the election choices for either. An enormous quantity of information and ideas are already in circulation. But this is true only of the information and the ideas which are much discussed thanks to published books, discussions unfolding in journals and the electronic mass media. They can be realistically chosen for debate in the decision making process. That is, only generally accessible ideas are part of the politicians' -and, even more obviously, the voters' -real "menu."
As has already been noted, only a relatively modest percentage of the voters regularly read the legal, political, or economic literature saturated with ideas and facts. Even among the jealous supporters of religion, far from everyone (with the exception of the followers of Judaism, some branches of Protestantism, and Orthodox sectarianism) are well acquainted with the primary texts (at least in translation). This is why ideology often turns out to be a "daily" superficial covering easy to absorb, even for religion. That is, it is a compact, easily absorbed set of ideas and views, which make it easier to determine one's own identity, as well as to "merge" with the crowd in which the market agent feels the most comfortable (or at least exposed to the least danger).
Ideology is one of the mechanisms for action coordination; a flexible mechanism not requiring "direct commands" as to when or how, given a high level of development of dictatorship, "commands are no longer needed, and each on his or her own knows what is to be done." Such a coordination mechanism lowers the costs for both the dictator (who is thus relieved of part of the "dirty work") and for the executors (who are thus provided with a lighthouse to orient themselves by in a sea of uncertainty, and a well-grounded hope of finding support for their actions, something that, if asked for directly, may be taken to be an expression of disloyalty).
But in democratic society, too, this mechanism can work thoroughly effectively (for instance, for coordinating action within a corporation of lawyers, academics, journalists, or politicians). Just as in a dictatorship, here, too, ideology permits avoiding direct agreements in situations when such agreements may be taken as something prejudicial or even illegal ("a conflict of interest"). Without mutual understanding, which the ideology conditions, agreements would not be "concluded."
Ideologically loaded statements are also used in agreements concluded with judges (albeit in far from equal shares by "conservative" and "liberal" politicians).
This may be the way to interpret the "disclaimer" made by the experienced judge Sonia Sotomayor, appointed to the US Supreme Court despite well-grounded objections from the opposition, about her "believing herself to be better prepared for work in the Supreme Court than a white male." 9 Possibly, there was no disclaimer, but rather an ideological and political signal publicly sent by the candidate. The first component is naturally aimed at the leftist liberal President (for whom Justice Sotomayor had to wait for eight years after making her statement, but the wait could in no way be considered irrational). The second is aimed at any politician interested in Hispanic American votes. Then again, the second component, too, may be interpreted as being "ideological," if the most primitive of ideologies is meant, which does not include any other ideas except "one that belongs -is good, one that does not belong is bad" and which reads the "belongs -does not belong" split exclusively along the ethnic-linguistic axes.
Even a strong and independent leader is subject to such ideology influence as "choice menu," the set of ideas most deliberated upon. Though not always feasible, there is the possibility of clearly delimiting the factor of the preferences and demands of the environment and the ideology factor pure and simple. Most decisions "fit" into a one-or two-dimensional space (depending on the period of American history involved).
Religion is a more complex notion than ideology. Even so, it has a corresponding ideological component 12 (which we intend to discuss below). The notion is highly contested that the religious views most widespread in a country are significant for the entrenchment of institutions friendly to the market. Indeed, if the significance of ideology as a coordinating mechanism or as a simple instrument for orienting oneself 10 Rubin 2001. in public issues (for supporting or opposing certain tendencies) is disregarded, then the connection looks doubtful.
Religion Is Significant
An important thesis of the Cairo speech 13 made by the US President Incumbent, was the following statement:
There is also one rule that lies at the heart of every religion that we do unto others as we would have them do unto us. This truth transcends nations and peoples -a belief that isn't new; that isn't black or white or brown; that isn't Christian, or Muslim or Jew. It's a belief that pulsed in the cradle of civilization...
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Translated from the political (leftist liberal) into economic terms, the statement is tantamount to the following. There are no fundamental or significant factors rooted in religion which can impact the quality of institutions or their ability to support or put an end to economic growth.
Below we will try to test this hypothesis.
The beginning of the 20 th century was marked by a series of publications of incontestable significance for the history of the social sciences, but whose conclusions were later severely criticized and rejected by most researchers.
Working independently of each other, Max Weber ( The idea was critically analyzed by the Libertarian representatives of the Austrian school. The principal arguments of these critics consist of two points.
The first is that all core capitalist institutions gestated during the period when the cities of Northern Italy flourished, Italy being a Catholic, not a Protestant country.
This argument seems to be particularly important. It appears insurmountable from the point of view of those authors who are certain of the positive impact of only "economic institutions" (the formal right of private property and the degree of itemization, the quality of delimitation, and so on; organizational forms of businessbanks, corporate societies, bookkeeping accounts, and more). But we cannot reject it in the same way; we, who believe that the most important institutions are not the formal guarantees of property, and certainly not the reproducible social-economicorganizational inventions. Such guarantees derive rather from basic rights, the rights which make it possible to provide for the maintenance and the transmission of rights of private property by means of defending the rights of the proprietors themselves.
This in turn means that that these rights provide for time sufficient for the search and optimization of all other decisions, both institutional and purely organizational.
Indeed, the cities of Northern Italy were among the first, back in the early Middle Ages, to begin lining up guarantees of the inviolability of the individual person. Thus, serfdom in some of these states had been abolished long before St. George's Day was done away with in Russia in the 13 th century (Kulisher 2004, p. 182) . Clearly enough, the political system was far from tallying with any definition of democracy, but it was rather competitive. At the same time, the towns were loyal to Catholicism and even had strong pro-Papal parties (with competition in them often taking place among different Guelph factions). A peculiar (and, in Florence, rather complex) separation of powers was also in evidence, aimed at preventing usurpation of power. Social structure was such that for centuries, several different centers of political influence were in existence, which provided counterweights for each other.
Obviously, economic and political degradation was preceded and accompanied by a profound moral crisis -the crisis of faith. The imperatives of Christianity enjoyed an extremely low level of authority. Not only historical chronicles, but also the creative literature of the time reflects the unraveling of family values, even though the institution of family in these areas was very sturdy until a certain point in time (see Botticini 1999 for information on marriage contracts during the first third of the 15 th century).
Male (homosexual) brothels in Florence and the encouragement of prostitution meant to distract people from sodomy in Venice (11,000 prostitutes per 100,000 population in the 15 th century) made an impression on all of Europe. The political successes enjoyed by Savonarola are to be in large part explained by the fatigue and annoyance of most Florentine burghers in the face of such a level of tolerance and "sexual freedom."
The present chapter, like the whole of this book, sets before itself no objective of explaining the reason for the downfall of Northern Italian cities. Let us only note that explanations which amount to the shift in trade routes resulting from great geographic discoveries, appears to be utterly inadequate. This is because, to begin with, the first- He limits himself instead to confirming the fact that the situation is qualitatively different in the developed countries. From our point of view, the formal attributes of leadership in the family are of little significance. But the vulnerability of a large part of the population, which precludes minimal safeguards for independent personal life, inviolability of the individual person, and so on, undermines the safeguards of private property in general. Now this last, in turn, understandably impacts possibilities of economic growth, as well.
Statistics "Confirming Nothing"
The literature contains many bald claims to the effect that the ideas of
Weber and Sombart about the significance of the religious factor find no confirmation. We are quite aware of the modest and purely illustrative role to be played by statistical analysis; even so, we cite here (Table 9 .1). (December), Table 3 , Additional Determinants of Democracy).
The following curious fact should be made a note of. Greif, based on his principal line of argument, writes that the "coalition" of Maghreb traders, founded upon trust and reputation, superseded its Genoese colleagues. The remark only underscores an obvious thought: for most scales, institutions providing for lowered transaction costs impersonally are more important than a sound reputation. Even so, Greif prefers not to overemphasize the self-evident fact that the Maghreb "coalition" of Jewish traders has a direct connection to the West, and only a tangential one (deriving from place of residence and political belonging of the traders) to the Islamic East, as well as that, accordingly, the ways to lower transaction expenses and the most important principles for creating and maintaining a reputation are rooted in the ethical and legal system of Western civilization. That is, they depend on a system sufficiently free of influence of personal attachments, dislikes, existence or absence of connection, and the like. The system must also be thoroughly sensitive to the violation of universal norms, including formalized and detailed Halachic law. It was precisely within such a system with a high level of documentation of the domestic turnover (which became known in connection with the discovery of a sizable collection of documents in the Genizah, or special storage space, in one of the synagogues of Fustat in Old Cairo) that the description of this coalition became possible.
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Interpreting the Statistics
Ethical monotheism features an entire series of elements which motivate its adherents to act cooperatively, as per the imperatives listed at the beginning of the present chapter (not worshipping idols, not murdering, supporting fair courts, "living and letting live").
19 Greif 1993. It is a reasonable assumption to make that in a society where the dominant views are based on a religion of ethical monotheism, transactional costs and project risks should be lower than in a society which does not abide by any such values.
On the level of the individual, these religions offer their followers a regime of "play with infinite moves" (posthumous reward, as well as recompense for both iniquities and good deeds according to the principle of "measure for measure"), and direct contact and direct responsibility in relating to a unique Higher Being (thus entailing the impossibility of "competition among the gods"). They also require being personally familiar with the sacred texts and rereading them on a regular basis (a practice which, even if does not cultivate a habitual way of working with the normative texts, still weakens the fear of reading them, instilling the idea of a higher origin of law, thus fostering obedience to the law without fear of law designed by humans).
In order to make the notion of retribution meaningful, these religions require individual freedom and personal responsibility (for further detail, see Chapter 12).
They forbid murder, threatening its perpetrators with severe punishment, and similarly prohibit seizing others' property, harming their reputation, and distorting justice. This threat is authorized by the "signature" of the Sole Creator and Ruler of the Universe; that is, these religions provide sanctions for institutions providing for property rights and the rights of property owners. Besides, thanks to the much reiterated formulation of these requirements both in codified form and individually, they are preserved even when left over as a "dry ideological remainder." Any form of ethical monotheism, however much reduced, necessarily contains these imperatives.
This does not mean that there are no significant differences among the varieties of ethical monotheism -Judaism, Protestantism, and modern Catholicism. However, in a reduced, ideological form, these distinctions also reduce to moderate differences of opinion.
Let us stress that reduction is a process inevitable insofar as such a thing as rational ignorance is in evidence. Even in a markedly religious society, the overwhelming majority normally does not spend sufficient amounts of time on promoting the kind of lifestyle and education about the religion with which people identify, in order for them to be identifiable as "religious" or even "observant."
Non-ethical monotheism is based on a rigid adherence to belief in a unique deity.
That is, it contains clearly defined sanctions for violating the will of the One Judge 
Demand for Prestige: Mechanism for the Realization of the Impact of Religion and Ideology on Economic Growth
The overwhelming majority of market agents ask for prestige, acknowledgment, respect of others, and self-respect as quality goods. Besides, the demand for these goods is often equivalent to the demand for all other goods (life and liberty excepted) taken together.
It is logical to assume that persons endowed with entrepreneurial talent face a choice: to attempt to realize these capabilities of theirs, or to opt for the more tranquil career of a hired worker and self-employed specialist.
But society may demonstrate its respect and gratitude to entrepreneurs simply because of their level of achievement, something which brings about an increase in business, variety of choices for hired workers and consumers of goods and services, growth in the production of these goods and services, both in terms of quantity and in terms of quality.
In this case it is reasonable to expect that a considerable majority of those having the right abilities will try to realize them in practice, so as to maximize their income, as well as the respect of others.
If society does not show respect for the work of an entrepreneur, it is likely that the most ambitious of the potential entrepreneurs can make a choice in favor of an alternative career. Then a great number of commercial projects profitable for all of society will remain unrealized. Moreover, society's holding business in disrespect in part takes on the qualities of a "self-fulfilled forecast," winnowing out precisely those entrepreneurs who are especially sensitive to moral evaluations of their work.
Thus, ideologies, both religious and secular ones, which provide a moral reward rather than simple legitimation of entrepreneurship, maximize production and rates of economic growth, softening to the utmost the consequences of crises. These last are resolved by the very fact that it is in times of crisis that the greatest number of business projects are undertaken, in connection with the weakening of competitors (the clearing of the market) and lowering of interest rates for creditors with a reliable reputation and well developed investment projects.
When all other variables are equal, possibilities for religiously rooted ideology turn out to be greater because the reward is promised during a period of unspecified duration, while the guarantor standing behind it is a Higher Being. Accordingly, every offender against an entrepreneur is taken to be a sinner, rather than a "cry of the people."
Not surprisingly, the religions which do the best job of legitimating entrepreneurship, economic success, and prosperity (Judaism and some versions of Protestantism), have grounds for claiming the role of catalyst in economic growth.
Golden Rule of Ethics: General and Particular
A familiar golden rule of ethics is usually used to ground the immateriality of differences among religions. Indeed, the same rule is to be encountered in more or less similar forms in nearly all the common creeds, as well as in secular ethical systems from antiquity to our day. We, however, want to direct the reader's attention to a substantial, albeit long since known difference in the formula. is stated in negative terms. It is put forth in response to the request of a prospective proselyte who wanted to hear the entire teaching formulated during the time that he could bear standing on one leg (that is, in brief). It is also no accident that the precise formulation is substantially longer than the golden rule itself, which presents the must of studying the Law. It is simple to say, and not at all simple to avoid overstepping the bounds of this imperative. The imperative "Go and learn" is thus an indelible part of No one is a true believer until he wishes for his brother the same that he wishes for himself (Sunna Forty Hadith of an-Nawawi 13).
Brahmanism, Confucianism, and Zoroastrianism all offer negative versions of the formulation of the golden rule.
President Obama did not simply choose a "positive" formulation (something that would be natural considering the transparence of the interests of the compiler and the presenter of the text, as well as considering that the formula is common to both Christianity and Islam). The President is not simply insisting, and quite correctly so, that this is the only true way to state the rule. He is also claiming, ipso facto, that there are no other ways to put it which are significantly different. The essence of the difference between the two approaches comes down to this: "to live and to let live" as opposed to "to drive humanity with an iron fist into heaven" (the heaven of political correctness, of general wellbeing, of tolerance and multiculturalism, to name just a few).
What we have here before us is the creed of socialist ideology, the ideology of state interference, which is generally inimical to the market, to entrepreneurship, to achievement, to the idea of freedom. I.e., this is the credo of an ideology maximally unfriendly to the market.
Economic Growth: Advantages and Problems of Islam as an Ideology
For purposes of further discussion, we introduce the notion of "Real
Islam" (RI).
"RI" is our way of designating the orientation dominant in this religion (the sum total of movements and organizations), which emphatically negates the Limited All its evident problems notwithstanding, RI has a whole series of advantages by comparison with ideologies dominant in many of today's democratic statessecularism, political correctness (see below), feminism, "progressive liberalism,"
"social state," and so on. 
Modern Leftist Ideologies: PC, Feminism, Rights Defense, and More
The content of modern leftist ideology largely reduces to the following claims:
The state exists for the primary purpose of providing mixed public goods;
providing pure public goods, especially the good of "defense," is, in essence, a deleterious anachronism;
The state should occupy itself with redistributing incomes and monetary assets, as well as interfere by force in conflicts in favor of minorities and in favor of the weak strata of the population;
Insofar as economic grounding of social politics has failed, and in its stead have come pseudo-ethical ones, the definition of ethical markers is essentially the prerogative of state officials; taking ethics or morals out of their authority with reference to some universal, eternal, super-human values dangerously weakens the grounding of discretionary regulation and redistribution (hence the understandable demand for state atheism);
The definition of the weak stratum or group, or even of such a quantitatively strictly definable notion as "minority," is the exclusive prerogative of specially authorized persons such that discussing or casting in doubt their decisions is an exercise of extremism, provocation, and hate-mongering.
Aiming at a redistributing, "caring" state leads to an important consequence.
Supporters of general arbitrary redistribution and maximizing the number of functions and the extent of the spheres of responsibility of state agents are in principle not interested in effective decisions. That is, they are not interested in decisions which require minimal resources and do not require state interference. Clearly, interest in state interference and maximized redistribution (described by Niskanen's model) is basally incompatible with interests motivating the search and implementation of any effective decisions.
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Examples are atomic energy or a strong army, market economy or a healthy family. Every such decision makes state interference superfluous, and so is potentially extremely dangerous for most leftist politicians and officials. At the same time, every ineffective decision leads to the possibility of grounding even greater state interference, since, as has been noted in the Introduction, the criterion of the rightfulness of interference in tandem with the magnitude and poignancy of the problem at stake has been successfully turned into a stereotype acceptable for the majority of the voters.
In isolated cases, leftists may be motivated to attempt to reach such decisions (the Social Democrat G. Schmidt, FRG Chancellor, in his struggle against the Red Army Faction terrorists; or B. Brandt, who supported the economic policies of L.
Erhardt at the turn of the 1940-50s). It is important to understand this, insofar as just as there are no autotelic interests of state, army, or any corporation, so there are no autotelic interests of leftists, statists, or the bureaucracy. However, the interest of the overwhelming majority of the leftists, the statists, and the bureaucrats consists in just this (something tangentially confirmed by the unpopularity of G. Schmidt among leftists).
Any ideology is a sort of set of markers which, whether accidentally or not, turns out to be the most comfortable for tenured state workers. This may well be accidental in the sense that it is not the outcome of the appearance of any particular union, agreement, or political decision; it may be simply the dominance of a certain ideology, as pointed out above, which makes it possible to avoid decision making of the kind that involves personal responsibility.
As has already been noted, an important tool endowing the ideology of universal "protection and care" with incredible flexibility is the arbitrary designation of minorities. Thus, according to this ideology, white Protestant males are by nature the majority. Women, who make up an obvious majority in the developed countries, are by nature a minority. Arabs and Moslems are an obviously persecuted minority, while the Protestants already mentioned and the Jews comprise the majority.
In practice, this opens a window of opportunity for openly lobbying in government and parliament for the interests of outright small, or even simply miniscule-sized groups -solitary unlucky women, terrorist leaders, and the like.
The conceptual framework of "political correctness" stands out among the best known models of leftist ideology. Political correctness may be defined, inter alia, as the ideologically motivated approach, widespread (especially since the 1980s) in the US and Western Europe, to analyzing facts, reporting events, presenting information to the public, and choosing strategies; the approach is based on the principle of moral relativism. Activists of the approach identify themselves as humanists and liberals, claiming a monopoly on interpreting liberalism and humanism in modern times. They try to buttress their claims with prohibitions against the expression of alternative points of view. Within the framework of this approach, "moral" or "good" is defined as anything profitable for the group being defended, the group having been chosen by the intellectual leader of the movement, who professes political correctness. The same leader arbitrarily determines what constitutes the good and the bad for the group (or groups) he has chosen for defending. 27 This choice is made without resorting to any formal procedure for specifying the interests of this group (or groups). The first known study of political correctness and its economic motivation is provided in the article by P. Rubin (1994) .
Arbitrarily Defended Principles
Given a particular situation, leftists may defend ideas which do only a poor job of coexisting with each other, or none at all:
27 Cp. with the approach of V. I. Lenin and the Bolsheviks: their idea of "class morality" was that everything is moral which is good for the working class. What is good or bad for the workers is decided by the party "of the new type," insofar as workers unacquainted with Protection of the family and aid for it 28 (in case of single-sex families) and struggle against it as an institution to the point of abolishing it as such (as a weapon of gender discrimination 29 ).
As an example, we may cite the refusal to resort to violence in resolving political problems (in the case of war against terrorism, as proclaimed by George Bush, Jr.);
we may also refer to the support this receives when the issue under consideration involves minorities proclaimed by the majority (of entrepreneurs, conservatives, religious Christians, Jews, owners of arms, proponents of private education, and so on).
Accordingly, the defense of "correct" ("official"; for instance, demands for introducing quotas for women, certain racial and religious groups) minorities in case of rejection of the idea of defending "incorrect" ones (for instance, conservatives in academic milieus, for whom, apparently, there must not be any quotas).
Besides the comfort, noted above, which is implied by such a mechanism of society management -a mechanism which leaves one's hands entirely free and entails no responsibility (no decisions reached as part of a progressive ideology are liable to be judged in court; responsible for them is ideology itself, i.e., nobody) -an important element comes to the fore, which simplifies the project of maintaining the comfortable situation for an unspecified period of time.
Leftist ideology, buttressed thus far by the objective interests of employees of the budget (or simply compulsorily) financed mass media (see Chapter 2), protects itself by prohibiting criticism (hate speech, hate crimes, 30 "incitation"), which includes everything opposed to the ideology (Jacoby 2009 ).
Arbitrarily Designated Values and Evaluations of Rights Defense
The problem Countries earning much better Freedom House evaluations than Italy -Sweden, Finland, or Czech -cannot show proof of competitive political TV and radio broadcasting. It should not be hard to concede that having the largest media holding be controlled by a political incumbent is not the best of the solutions hypothetically 30 Excluding crimes of this type from the normal US order of investigation is arbitrary, not being warranted by any consideration in earnest (Jacoby, May 17, 2009 This is far behind the Scandinavian countries, Germany, and many others. Great
Britain has a rating lower than the "model" countries. Certain elements of competition are to be observed in this country even on the TV-broadcasting market after the reforms introduced by Margaret Thatcher.
The US -the one country where, along with leftist TV channels, there is one all- In the absence of outside challenges from successful and powerful market democracies, the demand of the Russian elite for liberal (in the classical sense of the word) reforms becomes considerably weaker. And when there is no vivid or attractive example to follow, the demand for such reforms "from down below" -from the Russian man in the street -is also inadequate.
Conclusions
Ideology is significant for economic growth. Religion, which for most people functions in a strongly reduced form (as a result of "rational ignorance") and so has a significant intersection with ideology, no less significantly impacts the behavior of market agents and their ability to cooperate. Ideology and religion impact the choice of profession and type of work, prestige and respect for property, entrepreneurial success, and therefore the quality makeup of entrepreneurs, the level of trust among transaction parties, and the level of transactional costs.
Ideology is the mechanism for collective action coordination, and such an effective one, that given the rule or the clear domination of a single ideology, it begins to compete with the law (even in a country with as powerful a judicial tradition as the US: consider the example of the liberal Judge S. Sotomayor; the demands of leftist radical "rights defending" organizations that the Bush candidacy publicly take oaths of fidelity to leftist liberal ideologemes, such as civil rights; a requirement which would in effect become a direct challenge to the principle of the authority of the law).
Barro has shown that the religious factor is statistically bound up in a significant way with known political institutions. The same is indicated by our study (Yanovskiy and Shulgin). Evidently, the united influence of ideologies and religions, which have a negative attitude to personal success and which do not defend or support the institution of private property, is in a significant and negative way correlated with long-term (beginning in 1820) economic growth rates.
38 A similar effect was to be observed in 2011, when the toppling of the Ben Ali regime in Tunis became an example for active citizens of Near Eastern countries.
In this connection, analyzing contemporary anti-capitalist doctrines -from modern varieties of statism and leftism to Islamic fundamentalism -appears appropriate.
Measures to liberalize the media and education markets may play a significant role during the period of introducing reforms and in order to restore the ideological competitiveness in lieu of the moral one (the consequences of which will be our focus of attention in Chapter 12). At the very least, they prevent the possibility of the blockage of reform by opponents.
